INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, a series of theoretical studies has been conducted on the debate over the Romano-Germanic inquisitorial and Anglo-American adversarial procedures. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) , who presumably initiated this trend, investigated the incentive structures of nonpartisan and advocacy procedures, showing the relative efficiency of advocacy in finding facts. Although they used the judiciary as an archetypal example of what their theory illustrates, there remains potential difficulty in applying their model to comparative legal procedures, especially in criminal trials, due to a unique feature of these procedures.
1 We address the long-standing debate over this procedural dichotomy, with specific focus on criminal procedures and, in doing so, we contribute some novel insights to the literature.
According to scholars of comparative judicial procedures, in the inquisitorial system, the judge, not a neutral investigator, plays an active role in investigating a case. Posner (1999) , a prominent defender of the American legal heritage, says: " [T] he only searcher is a professional judge. That is a caricature of the inquisitorial system that prevails in Continental Europe. " Tullock (1980:87) , an icon of the opposite side of this debate, agrees: in the inquisitorial system "the judges or judge are, in essence, carrying on an independent investigation of the case, and the parties play a much minor role."
2 In contrast, the nonpartisan model of Dewatripont and Tirole assumes that a nonpartisan agent, not the decision-making principal, collects information. Thus, their nonpartisan model differs structurally from the inquisitorial procedure in terms of common language, and their theoretical treatment of the procedure fails to fully capture its organizational structure. Moreover, an inquisitor judge often bears the greater responsibility for fact-gathering in criminal trials than in civil ones (see Langbein, 1985) .
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To examine and contrast the inquisitorial and adversarial paradigms with structural accuracy, we revisit the same issue of procedural comparison with a focus on criminal trials. We develop a formal model which depicts the following two procedural alternatives. In the adversarial system, a prosecutor and a defense attorney litigate as the representatives of the state and of a defendant, respectively. The prosecutor sends a judge a signal which summarizes collected evidence on the defendant's guilt, while the defense attorney sends a signal which may prove innocence. The signals are assumed to be informative but imperfect, the informativeness of a signal hinging on the level of effort each party exerts at cost. Based on the two signals, the judge makes a binary decision between conviction or acquittal, and she pronounces the defendant convicted only if her belief as to his guilt exceeds the threshold of a "reasonable doubt." In the inquisitorial system, on the other hand, the judge herself collects both of the two signals instead of receiving them from the prosecutor and the defense attorney.
4,5 To paraphrase, the adversarial system delegates the three tasks at hand to separate entities, whereas the inquisitorial counterpart assigns all of the tasks to the judge.
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In the circumstance described above, we found that the inquisitorial system presents two obstacles to the effective execution of the three tasks:
(a) The inquisitorial system fails to effectively structure incentives for collecting evidence because the inquisitor judge is assigned two conflicting tasks which aim to prove opposing claims. In other words, the judge in the inquisitorial system faces a dilemma in simultaneously searching for incriminating evidence and exonerating evidence. Psychologically, " a nonadversarial trial is like trying to play chess against yourself : neither Black nor White pieces get played very well, and second-rate games result " (Luban 1988:71). This finding mirrors Dewatripont and Tirole, who demonstrated that the nonpartisan arrangement is largely less efficient than the advocating one. In the adversarial system, by contrast, this mutual offsetting of the two incentives does not arise because the opposing evidence is pursued by separate entities.
(b) In the inquisitorial system, any incentive arrangement to induce search efforts inevitably interferes with the judge's decision to render a conviction. This is due to the centralized nature of the inquisitorial system, wherein a single authority engages in both fact-determining and fact-finding. If a fact-finder is assigned to determine facts by herself, the incentive to find facts could plausibly be eroded. The fact-finder in this situation resembles a dance performer who evaluates her own dancing. The resulting dance is likely to be mediocre at best. In the adversarial system, on the contrary, strong incentives to collect evidence can be maintained, because the fact-finders do not engage in determining facts themselves. The separation between the fact-determiner and the fact-finders constitutes an important advantage in the adversarial system. This finding was not expressed by Dewatripont and Tirole because their nonpartisan model structurally differs from our inquisitorial counterpart as stated above.
From findings (a) and (b) above, we derive the following three shortcomings of the inquisitorial system: ( i ) Findings (a) and (b) combined form a judge's trilemma : a better performance of one task compromises or sacrifices one or two of the others. The trilemma thus suggests that the inquisitorial system cannot fully accommodate all three tasks at the same time. This may be a critical drawback of the inquisitorial system, but has been overlooked in the literature on comparative criminal procedures. We believe that this trilemma is the most innovative finding of this article.
( ii ) In a case where the litigants' or their representatives' private motives for winning prevail over the judge's social motive for enforcing criminal law, the adversarial system may outperform the inquisitorial one when it comes to presenting informative evidence to the court. (Put more precisely, the incentive compatibility constraints for costly evidence collections are less restrictive in the adversarial system than in the inquisitorial one if the litigants' payoffs from winning a suit are larger than or equal to the judge's payoffs from accurate adjudications.
7 ) It is because the latter lacks a means for harnessing the power of self-interest on each side necessary to unearth the best evidence. In this vein, Posner (1988) insisted that the very advantage of the adversarial system lies in its reliance on the private energies of litigants to prove their cases, but such motives can hardly be expected from judges:
[T ]he judges do not bear those costs [of protracted proceedings ] Our model renders a solid theoretical foundation to this claim. It might be interesting that the adversarial system makes use of the private energies of the litigants, energies which may ultimately serve the public interest in ferreting out the truth, whereas the inquisitorial system relies on the public interest of the judge but could be less of a vehicle toward the public goal. In this sense, the relative merit of the adversarial system over the inquisitorial one may derive from its reliance on self-interested parties in dispute. However, our discussion does not claim that the adversarial procedure is superior to the inquisitorial counterpart in structuring every aspect of a criminal justice system. 8 Our focus is solely on the incentive arrangement for evidence search and its effect on judgment. Other critical concerns about criminal trials such as costs of litigation, protection of individual rights, and abuses of government authority remain out of our scope.
( iii ) A logical consequence of the trilemma is that the only incentive arrangement available to the inquisitorial system is merely to manipulate the judge's threshold to render conviction. This restrictiveness further implies that there may not exist any incentive scheme to induce high-effort investigation. The adversarial system, on the contrary, allows for a corresponding incentive scheme by which the costs of search efforts are covered by the motivated litigants.
We further extend our model to investigate the possibility that shortcoming (ii ) above is overturned. We demonstrate that the quality of evidence presented to the judge can be undermined when overzealous attorneys are tempted to obscure the truth or even to concoct false evidence for a self-serving resolution. This finding corresponds to Tullock's (1997) rent-seeking scenario associated with the adversarial system in which undeserving parties attempt to mislead judges in order to secure possibly incorrect conclusions that they favor.
9 In this regard, the prohibition of a contingency fee (Wolfram, 1986:535-538 ) and the establishment of an evidence rule (Posner, 1999; Sanchirico, 2004) are possible remedies to prevent the fabrication of evidence.
Among the theoretical articles on comparative legal procedures, Palumbo (2001, 2006) and Emons and Fluet (2009a) assumed a neutral investigator instead of an inquisitor judge to collect evidence, possibly because their focuses were not specifically on criminal cases, where a judge's involvement in fact-finding is more extensive than in civil cases (see endnote 3). On the other hand, there are several studies (Shin, 1998; Froeb and Kobayashi, 2001; Parisi, 2002) whose treatments of the inquisitorial procedure are similar to ours, but with different interests. Shin's (1998) model with exogenous evidence collection suggests that the adversarial procedure is superior, its superiority stemming from its ability to allocate the burden of proof between the parties in dispute. Froeb and Kobayashi (2001) compared the accuracy of evidence produced by the two systems (or two variances of random variables drawn from the two procedures in their model) and concluded that neither strictly dominates the other. Parisi (2002) considered a hybrid system of the inquisitorial and adversarial procedures, instead of treating them as purely dichotomous, and sought an optimal mixture of the two in light of rent-seeking litigants.
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the formal framework of a judge's decision-making problem. Section 3 describes the adversarial procedure, while Section 4, which is the main focus of the article, describes the inquisitorial procedure and makes a comparison between the two. Section 5 points out a potential drawback in the adversarial procedure. Section 6 draws our investigation to a conclusion.
A JUDGE'S DECISION PROBLEM
Before presenting a comprehensive model of criminal trial, we illustrate the decision problem of a judge J whose task is to render a judgment of conviction C or acquittal A. Although J is uncertain about whether a defendant sent to her court is guilty or innocent, t ∈ G, I , she has the prior probability that the defendant is guilty PrG. She makes the decision based on two signals, s P ∈ 0, 1 and s D ∈ 0, 1, presented by a prosecutor P and a defense attorney D, respectively. The signal s P can be regarded as a summary of evidence of guilt collected by the prosecutor, and s D as that of innocence by the defense attorney. These two signals follow conditional distributions F P s P |t and F D s D |t with their associated densities f P s P |t and f D s D |t.
Based on the two signals sP, s D  , J can rationally update her belief of the defendant 's guilt :
A larger value of s P or s D implies more significant evidence of guilt (larger PrG | s P , s D ) if the monotone likelihood ratio properties are satisfied as follows:
Assumption 1:
The judge J prefers a defendant to be convicted if and only if the belief of guilt exceeds the threshold of reasonable doubt q ∈ 0, 1. Namely, J 's ex post payoff can be shown as:
where the parameter M determines the significance of misjudgments.
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Given the signal structure and J 's preference as above, the judge's rational decision rule can be described as follows: 
where s P , s D  denotes the probability of conviction determined by J who received s P , s D . It is immediate that the optimal choice of s P , s D  is
Lemma 1 suggests that given s P and s D , J always makes a deterministic, not randomized, decision. The threshold s P s D  is non-increasing because a stronger signal from one party is required to compensate for a weaker signal from the other (Figure 1 ). Conditional on J 's strategy s P s D , the probability in state t that J acquits the defendant is
Since the judge J has only imperfect information about a case, occasional misjudgments are apparently unavoidable. 
THE ADVERSARIAL PROCEDURE
We further develop the model above to describe an adversarial criminal procedure by incorporating the incentive problem concerning costly evidence collections by the prosecutor P and the defense attorney D.
12 For the following game with the players J, P, and D, we will focus on perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where (a) all the players choose their strategies to maximize their expected payoffs given others' equilibrium strategies, and (b) their beliefs as to others' strategies are consistent with the equilibrium strategies.
P and D share the prior probability PrG with the judge J. Each of the two parties in a dispute engages in an unverifiable effort to search for evidence. This effort is a binary choice for each party, and is costly only at the higher levels (e P ∈ LP, H P  and e D ∈ LD, H D  with L P  L D  0 ). P and D simultaneously choose their effort levels which influence the distributions of the signals. To compress tedious arithmetic, it is assumed that P can strengthen his signal through high effort only in the state of guilt, while D can do so only in the state of innocence.
13 Namely, the distributions of the two signals are modified as follows:
Assumption 1 continues to hold regardless of effort levels. Assumption 2 implies: ( i ) when the defendant is guilty, G, the distribution of the inculpatory signal s P produced by the prosecutor's high effort H P first-order stochastically dominates the distribution by his low effort L P ; (ii ) when the defendant is innocent, I, the distribution of the exculpatory signal s D with the defense attorney's high effort H D is first-order stochastically dominated by the distribution with the attorney's low effort L D . Notice that since P 's (D 's) effort strengthens his signal distribution only in state G ( I ) and is meaningless in the other state, higher efforts always convey more informative signals to the judge and thus can assist her in making a more accurate adjudication. Since the efforts e P and e D change the signal distributions, J would condition her judgment rule on them, r eP, e D , which paraphrases the more cumbersome threshold function s P s D |e P , e D . Namely, the rule r eP, e D  dictates to the judge that for given s D ,
The probability of acquittal in state t given that P and D choose eP, e D  and
High efforts might be expected of the representatives (P and D ) if judgments result in a reward of an extra payoff ( w P or w D ); i.e., P (D ) will receive w P (w D ) when he wins the case.
14 With the payoff from losing a case being normalized as zero, P 's incentive compatibility constraint to induce the high effort in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is
while D 's incentive compatibility constraint is
These constraints depend on the sizes of effort costs ( H P and H D ), the relative likelihood of each state ( PrG or Pr I), and how each effort influences the judgment. 15 They suggest that the high efforts can be expected only if the compensations ( w P and w D ) are affordable to the litigants.
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Conditions ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium with high efforts HP, H D  to exist. However, its uniqueness is not necessarily guaranteed. In fact, depending on the effort costs, there can also exist other equilibria where P or D does not exert the high efforts. The issue of multiple equilibria will be addressed in the Appendix.
THE INQUISITORIAL PROCEDURE AND ITS COMPARISON WITH ADVERSARIAL PROCEDURE
We next present an alternative model of an inquisitorial criminal system, where the judge J actively investigates a case on her own, and compare it with the model of the adversarial system. We aim to demonstrate: ( i ) a judge in the inquisitorial system may suffer a trilemma among the three tasks she confronts; ( ii ) the adversarial system might be better at collecting evidence on a case if attorneys' private interests in winning a suit are plausibly stronger than the judge's public interests in avoiding erroneous judgments; and ( iii ) in the inquisitorial system there is no incentive scheme to induce costly evidence collection when the costs are sufficiently large relative to the judge's public interests.
In the inquisitorial system, J herself finds signals instead of P and D, and utilizes them for her judgment. This means that J engages in all three tasks of collecting evidence of guilt, collecting evidence of innocence, and judging a case.
17 In the adversarial system, each of these tasks is delegated to a separate entity. Notice that this inquisitorial model differs from the nonpartisan agent model of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) , where the decision-maker and the information-collector are not identical. To avoid giving an unfair advantage to either system, we impartially assume that the costs of efforts for better signals in the inquisitorial system are the same as in the adversarial one. J 's incentive compatibility constraints for high efforts are:
High-effort investigations can be expected if the costs to collect evidence are lower than the expected loss from erroneous judgments. These constraints (Conditions ( 3 ), ( 4 ), and ( 5 )) differ from those of the adversarial system (Conditions ( 1 ) and ( 2 )) due to the fundamental difference that, in the inquisitorial system, a single entity engages in all of the three tasks. This fundamental difference is two-fold: ( a ) both incriminating evidence and exonerating evidence are collected by the same agent; and ( b) both evidence collection and judgment are also conducted by the same agent.
18
Difference ( a ) trivially generates the additional constraint (Condition ( 5 )) not to simultaneously shirk the two efforts e P and e D . Moreover, since the inquisitor judge confronts two activities which aim to prove opposing claims, the implementation of the two is presumably difficult. To paraphrase more formally, suppose that J is given extra payoffs w A  0 from acquittal and w C  0 from conviction:
19 Then, J 's ex post payoffs 1 − q M and qM in Conditions ( 3 ), ( 4 ) and ( 5 ) Proposition 1 suggests that the judge in the inquisitorial system may face a dilemma between collecting two pieces of conflicting evidence. For instance, an attempt to incentivize the effort to prove guilt by raising w C may adversely affect the other incentives for e D because the incentive compatibility constraints for e P and e D are inter-related. 20 In part due to this offsetting, we observe no such incentive arrangements among judiciaries in reality. This proposition mirrors Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) in their claim that "advocates' rewards closely track their performance whereas nonpartisans' incentives are impaired by their pursuing several causes at one time."
In relation to difference (b), we next explore another feature of the inquisitorial system which was not addressed by Dewatripont and Tirole. In the adversarial system, the prosecutor's and defense attorney's incentive schemes can be conditional on the judge's decision. In other words, they can be paid more when the judgment favors their clients. In the inquisitorial system, on the contrary, since the judge searches for evidence herself, any incentive scheme for search efforts inevitably causes a distortion of judgment and thereby hinders her incentive for search. For instance, as long as the judge is paid more for a conviction, she may simply render more convictions instead of making an effort to collect evidence of guilt no matter how an incentive scheme is designed. Since an arrangement wA, w C  alters J 's ex post payoffs, it affects the judge's threshold to render conviction and therefore her judgment rule r   e P ,  e D  . 21 In other words, to keep the judge's threshold unaffected, any payoff arrangement should be abandoned.
Proposition 2:
In the inquisitorial system, the acquittal-contingent payoff w A raises the threshold of rendering a conviction q by w A / M , while the conviction-contingent payoff w C lowers the threshold by w C / M . Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that a judge in the inquisitorial system may suffer a trilemma among her three tasks; that is, a better performance of one task hinders or sacrifices one or two of the others. Because of this trilemma, the inquisitorial system cannot fully satisfy all three tasks simultaneously unless the costs of evidence collection, H P and H D , are sufficiently small that Conditions ( 3 ), ( 4 ) and ( 5 ) are satisfied even without a payoff arrangement wA, w C  . Apparently, the trilemma never emerges in the adversarial system because it can structure an incentive scheme without affecting the judge's threshold.
Due to difference (b), the inquisitor judge knows the true effort levels eP, e D , unlike her adversarial counterpart. Below we argue that this difference makes search efforts harder to induce in the inquisitorial system than in the adversarial one. To interpret this effect, it would be helpful to contrast J 's beliefs as to effort levels   e P ,  e D  in the two systems. In the inquisitorial system, since J herself investigates a case, she knows the true effort levels eP, e D  and thus can adjust the judgment rule according to the change in effort levels. In the adversarial system, on the other hand, J 's judgment rule is fixed because J cannot observe the effort levels. In short, J takes the change in effort levels into consideration in the inquisitorial system, but she does not do so in the adversarial one. This difference between the two systems in J 's belief   e P ,  e D  makes the inquisitorial constraints more restrictive than the adversarial ones.
Proposition 3: As long as the private interests in winning a case are stronger than the public ones in avoiding an erroneous judgment, i.e., w P ≥ 1− q M and w D ≥ qM , there exists a non-empty range of the effort costs HP, H D  where high efforts are exerted in the adversarial system, but not in the inquisitorial system.
The range of H P , for instance, corresponds to the difference between the left-hand sides of Conditions (1) and ( 2 ). The range of H D can be derived similarly. The proof is provided in the Appendix, but its intuitive account is as follows: If e P is shirked, for instance, J may reduce the threshold for conviction in the inquisitorial system (Condition ( 3 )), but she does not do so in the adversarial one (Condition ( 1 )). Then, when J receives poor evidence of guilt (a small s P ), J in the adversarial system will infer, without knowing the true effort level, that the defendant is likely to be innocent, but J in the inquisitorial system may reason that the poor evidence is due to insufficient investigation (L P ) instead of the defendant's innocence. Consequently, even from the same signals, the adversarial J may acquit, whereas the inquisitorial J convicts. If the prosecutor P is willing to avoid such an acquittal, he would make a higher effort than the corresponding judge J in the inquisitorial system, resulting in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 may seem trivial at a glance, but it is not so in the sense that its inverse does not hold. Namely, even if public interests dominate private ones (1− q M ≥ w P and qM ≥ w D ), there does not necessarily exist a non-empty range of H P , H D  where the high efforts are exerted only in the inquisitorial system.
The premise of Proposition 3, that w P ≥ 1− q M and w D ≥ qM, is not unnatural if private interests prevail over social interests. For instance, a defense counsel's willingness to prove the innocence of his client is likely to be much greater than a judge's willingness not to convict an innocent defendant. Proposition 3 implies that under this premise, the inquisitorial system could underperform the adversarial system in bringing more informative evidence to court. Figure 2 shows the area of the effort costs H P , H D  where high efforts are possible in the adversarial system, but not so in the inquisitorial one. In the figure, the parameter values and distribution functions are specified as follows:
The contingent fees in the adversarial system are set to be the smallest possible: w P  1− q M  100 ; w D  qM  900. The next proposition further suggests the impossibility for the inquisitorial system to promote evidence collection. ( 4 ) and ( 5 ) never hold for q ≤ 0 (q ≥ 1) because J renders a conviction (an acquittal) regardless of the signals and thus is not willing to engage in costly evidence collection.  Proposition 4 holds that since incentive arrangements are severely restricted in the inquisitorial system, it may be impossible to induce the judge's costly investigation. This mechanism crucially differs from that of the adversarial system in its reliance on the judge's social motives, not the attorneys' private ones. In the adversarial system, although (or because) prosecutors and defense attorneys are driven by private interests to win a case, they can consequently serve the social interest of suppressing misjudgments; in the inquisitorial system, on the other hand, although the judge's motivation originates in the social interest (or because she lacks motivation from private interests), she may fail to collect informative evidence for a case.
To summarize, we posited three shortcomings of the inquisitorial procedure: ( i ) trilemma ( Propositions 1 and 2 ); ( ii ) underperformance in investigation ( Proposition 3 ); ( iii ) impossibility ( Proposition 4 ). We next point out a potential drawback in the adversarial procedure.
THE ADVERSARIAL PROCEDURE RE-EXAMINED
Section 3 examined the adversarial procedure in a restricted circumstance in which an effort by each party strengthens his signal only in one state. This section will re-examine the adversarial procedure without such a restriction by extending our model to the case in which an effort strengthens the signal regardless of whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. Suppose that P 's effort choice is trinary e P ∈ LP, H P , X P  with Assumption 3 means that an excessive effort by P (D ) can produce a stronger signal of guilt (innocence) even when the defendant is innocent (guilty). That is, it may give an incorrect impression to the judge in favor of the party or even at times distort evidence to obscure the truth and mislead the judge (see endnote 8 ). If so, the moderate efforts HP, H D  might be preferable to the excessive ones XP, X D  for purposes of assisting the judge. The incentive compatibility constraints not to make excessive efforts are:
and
In contrast, the inquisitorial system is apparently free from such an incentive problem since it is absurd for the judge to produce misleading signals even at costs.
Proposition 5:
The excessive efforts XP, X D  can never be chosen in the inquisitorial system, but can be chosen in the adversarial system unless Conditions (6) and (7) hold.
If Proposition 5 applies, the adversarial system would not necessarily outperform the inquisitorial one in discovering useful evidence: the two parties in dispute merely indulge in rent-dissipation without contributing to accurate adjudication. 23 In this regard, it may make sense: to prohibit contingency fees for criminal defense as broadly practiced (see endnote 14); to establish the rule of evidence (Posner, 1999; Sanchirico, 2004) ; or to induce efforts from each side to find the flaws in the other's evidence (Palumbo, 2006) although such a mechanism is abstracted away from our model.
CONCLUSION
We made a theoretical comparison of the criminal court systems. Specifically, we considered how incentives to collect evidence of a defendant's guilt or innocence can be provided in the inquisitorial and adversarial procedures. In the inquisitorial system, evidence collection is conducted by judges, who are motivated by the social interest in penalizing only criminals. In the adversarial system, on the other hand, evidence collection is delegated to prosecutors and defense attorneys, who are motivated by the private interest of winning a case. We showed that this difference in task assignment creates a sharp contrast between the two procedures and results in three shortcomings of the inquisitorial procedure.
First, because the judge in the inquisitorial system is assigned three tasks which are mutually incompatible by nature, she may not be able to meet all of the tasks simultaneously. In this regard, a relative merit of the adversarial system may lie in the separation between performers (P and D ) and an examiner ( J ). If a performer evaluates her own performance, the incentive to perform well would plausibly be impaired. (In a similar analogy, students are not allowed to grade their own school exams because they would not otherwise study hard.) This same lack of incentive characterizes the inquisitorial system and can be one of its major drawbacks. This argument is missing in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) , who maintain that the separation between performers is the key for the adversarial system's effectiveness. Second, the adversarial system may outperform the inquisitorial one at inducing evidence collection if attorneys' private interests in winning a suit plausibly dominate a judge's social interests in judicial accuracy.
24 A caveat to this result is that the adversarial system would not necessarily prevail over the inquisitorial one if overzealous attorneys are tempted to fabricate evidence and mislead the judge for their own ends. Third, since the inquisitorial system is not designed to exploit attorneys' private energies, it cannot accommodate costly investigations if they are too costly for the judge who lacks motivation other than professional esprit.
We conclude this article by providing possible future research directions. Our model is restricted to cases in which the judge makes only a binary decision of either conviction or acquittal, but a judge in court also hands down a sentence. Thus, a possible theoretical extension of the model is to give a judge more than two alternatives: determining both fact and penalty.
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In addition, theoretical investigations on contingency fees have been conducted only in civil cases (e.g., Rubinfeld and Scotchmer, 1993; Klement and Neeman, 2004; Baik, 2008; Leshem, 2009) . This is probably due to practical appeal or empirical relevance to the majority of legal systems in the U.S. and Europe. However, given the lack of theoretical, empirical, and comparative studies on criminal contingency fees, we have been given no clue to help us discern the relevance of such fees or to help us predict their roles in criminal cases.
26 Significant insights will be garnered wholly from research on contingency fees in criminal cases, which have several unique features -plea bargaining, prosecutorial discretion, indigent defendants, the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, privilege against self-incrimination, and the lack of res.
APPENDIX: Multiple Equilibria in the Adversarial System
We argue below that depending on the size of the effort costs HP, H D , multiple equilibria can emerge in the game of the adversarial system with the binary effort choices: e P ∈ where V P and V D stand for P 's and D 's expected payoffs.
To specify equilibria, we first claim that P 's and D 's best responses are mutually independent of each other's strategy. It is because of Assumption 2 that the distribution function of s P (s D ) is contingent on e P (e D ) only in state G ( I ). It can also be claimed that P 's (D 's) best response e P (e D ) can vary with J 's belief on e P and e D if the cost H P (H D ) is not too large or too small. This situation between P (D ) and J resembles the coordination game. In this coordination game between P (D ) and J, there can be two pure-strategy equilibria (one with P 's (D 's) high effort and the other with the low effort) and also a mixed-strategy equilibrium where P (D ) randomizes his effort level. Therefore, mixed-strategy equilibria having been ruled out due to analytical complexity, four equilibria in total can be considered in the game of the adversarial system:
and L P , L D  with corresponding J 's beliefs and strategies. Figure 3 shows the areas of the effort costs where each of the four equilibria emerges with the numerical example used in Section 3.
27 Not surprisingly, a high effort is more likely to be exerted in an equilibrium when its cost is smaller. If the costs are in the middle range, all four equilibria can coexist. In light of multiple equilibria, it is not immediate to determine which equilibrium is most likely to emerge. A heavily unbalanced adversarial system, as observed in the Japanese judiciary, might be explained as a result (possibly failure) of equilibrium selection. Proof of Proposition 3. Here will be shown that given w P ≥ 1− q M and w D ≥ qM, Conditions ( 3 ), ( 4 ) and ( 5 ) suffice Conditions ( 1 ) and ( 2 ). The incentive compatibility constraint on e P (Condition ( 3 )) tells us that J 's expected payoff from HP, H D  is no less than the one from shirking LP, H D :
Because J 's expected payoff is maximized when her belief is correct
(Notice that the belief is not consistent with the effort levels on the right-hand side of the condition.) Since the distribution of s P is independent of e P in state I (F P s P | I, H P   F P s P | I, L P  from Assumption 2 ), 6. Our model does not aim to capture the criminal procedure of a specific judiciary. Rather, it is designed to capture the essence of the two procedures. The adversarial procedure differs in detail across judiciaries of the Anglo-American tradition, and so does the inquisitorial one on the European Continent. 7. This shortcoming (ii) seems trivial, but it is not so on the grounds that its inverse does not hold; i.e., the judge's social motive prevailing over litigants' private motives does not necessarily lead to the inquisitorial system's superiority over the adversarial one in inducing search efforts. We refrain from outlining a detailed explanation here, but the primary reason lies in the fact that, while a judge in the inquisitorial system knows the level of search efforts, a judge in the adversarial system does not. This difference in knowledge of the true effort levels gives the litigants' representatives greater incentives to collect evidence. 8. For drawbacks of the adversarial system, see Tullock (1980 Tullock ( :87-104, 1988 . 9. This concern was raised by other scholars as well (e.g., Langbein, 1985; Wolfram, 1986:566; Zywicki, 2008) .
10. The threshold of reasonable doubt q is frequently employed in models of criminal trial.
The judge's preference is consistent with the minimization of expected error costs. For expository details, see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) . The cost associated with misjudgments M will later be compared with the costs of producing evidence. 11. The probability that the equality will hold measure zero and is safely ignored. 12. To depict the model more explicitly, P and D are the agents of the state and of the defendant, respectively. These litigants determine remuneration schemes to their agents, while the agents choose the effort levels of evidence search. 13. In Section 5, we will consider how results differ if this restriction is relaxed. 14. A reader may be put off by the idea of extra payoffs since the ban on contingency-fee arrangements in criminal cases is considered to be a universal feature (Lushing, 1991) . A striking exception to this feature is Japan, where contingent contracts in criminal defense are ubiquitous. In addition, although a contingency fee on criminal defense is formally banned, it is practically exercised: "the lawyer is aware that there is a risk of nonpayment, and that, if the client is convicted and sent to jail, there will often be no recourse" (Karlan, 1993) . Prosecutors and defense attorneys may also have non-pecuniary concerns such as career development or reputational capital (Kritzer, 2004) . Given these motivating forces, it is unnatural to ignore the option of extra payoffs contingent upon resolution of the case. A historical account for the ban in the U.S. appears in Wolfram (1986:535-538) . 15. For instance, in the Japanese judiciary where prosecutors file only very strong cases (suggesting large Pr (G )), a defense attorney has little incentive to develop his criminal defense skills (Nakao and Tsumagari, 2011) . 16. For Condition ( 2 ), we assume that the defense attorney cannot screen out guilty defendants, and thus make contingent contracts with both the guilty and the innocent; i.e., the equilibrium is pooling in the (implicit) game of the contract between the defendant and his attorney. Such screening is likely to be difficult if defendants have various tastes for conviction or "types." (In a similar context, Grossman and Katz (1983) demonstrate the impossibility of prosecutorial office screening in plea bargaining when defendants have different degrees of risk aversion.) Theoretically, this pooling equilibrium makes sense if the contract between the defendant and his attorney is observable to third parties, including judges. Otherwise, a judge could infer from the form of the contract that the defendant is guilty when only innocent defendants make contingent contracts. If screening is possible, the attorney would also be informed of the defendant's state, and Pr I  of Condition ( 2 ) should be eliminated in the separating equilibrium, thus loosening the constraint. 17. This assumption characterizes the inquisitor judge's extensive role in conducting a case; in effect, she may absorb the roles of the prosecutor and the defense attorney. See endnote 5. 18. To contrast these two differences, it might be helpful to imagine the eclectic model of two agents corresponding to the nonpartisan agent model of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) , where the judgment is assigned to one and evidence collection to the other, although we refrain from explicitly presenting it. 19. Because it remains unknown whether a defendant is guilty or not even after a judgment is made, the judge's incentive scheme cannot be based on state t ∈ G, I , and thus any institutional arrangement cannot directly penalize the judge for her wrongful judgment. 20. We cannot give a general prediction of whether a rise in a contingent payoff, say w C , supports or hinders each of Conditions ( 3 ), ( 4 ) 23. There does not necessarily exist any w P (w D ) that satisfies both Conditions ( 1 ) and ( 6 ) (Conditions ( 2 ) and ( 7 ) ), depending on parameter values and distribution functions. This non-existence of contingent fees may be another reason the adversarial system fails to induce the most informative efforts HP, H D .
24. Our claim is not that the adversarial procedure is superior to or socially more desirable than its inquisitorial counterpart. Nor do we conduct any welfare comparison between the two procedures. In fact, given that evidence is costly to produce, accuracy in adjudication does not necessarily enhance social welfare (Polinsky and Shavell, 1989; Kaplow, 1994) . In other words, there may be a tradeoff concerning the benefit of increasing accuracy and the cost of producing evidence. Nonetheless, it is too strong to assume that this tradeoff can be adequately resolved by the inquisitor judge. As Posner (1988) poignantly pointed out, the judge may not be the right person to choose the amount of evidence or the degree of the accuracy. The judge does not bear any personal cost of mistakenly sanctioning an innocent. The innocent does.
25. For instance, a defendant's willingness to prove his innocence may depend on the size of penalty he anticipates from conviction. Thus, someone charged with a felony, or his significant other, is likely to be willing to pay more to his counsel than another charged with a misdemeanor. However, if the roles of a defense counsel are restricted as in the inquisitorial system, such a behavioral pattern might be less distinct. 26. To the best of our knowledge, there is little study on conditional or contingency fees in criminal cases -a rare exception is Stephen et al. (2008) , who showed the influence of a defense lawyer's remuneration on plea bargaining -despite the presence of a legal system allowing contingency fees in criminal defense. See endnote 14. 
